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Abstract:
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are among the most complex
cyberattacks and are generally executed by cyber-attackers linked to
nation-states. An organization may have security strategies to prevent
APTs. However, a false sense of security may exist when the focus is
on implementing security strategies but not on the effectiveness of
implemented security strategies. This research aims to find out 1) if
organizations are in a false sense of security while preventing APT
attacks, 2) what factors influence the false sense of security, and 3)
whether organizational culture influence factors contributing to the
false sense of security. A theoretical model is developed to evaluate
the sense of security to answer the three research questions. The
initial model includes seven independent variables, one moderator
variable, and one dependent variable. We designed and conducted a
survey among cybersecurity professionals to test 14 hypotheses on
the sense of security. We further refined and finalized the model
based on the data analysis from the survey data. This research
confirms that employees are not confident about organizations‟
cybersecurity posture despite all the awareness training, technological
advancements, and massive investment. We also identified key
factors which influence the employee perception of cybersecurity
posture. Based on the research findings, we provided
recommendations that can be followed to improve the effectiveness
of implemented security strategies.
Keywords: Advanced Persistent Threats, APTs, Cybersecurity, Sense
of Security, False Sense of Security

I. Introduction
The United States Air Force coined the phrase
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) in 2006 [1]. An
advanced persistent threat is defined as “an entity
that engages in a malicious, organized, and highly
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867

sophisticated long-term or reiterated network
intrusion and exploitation operation to obtain
information from a target organization, sabotage
its operations, or both” [2]. An APT attack is a
prolonged, aimed attack on a specific target, in
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which cyber attackers gain access to a system or
network and remain there for an extended period
without being detected. APTs occupy news
headlines often because of the potential damage
they can cause regarding reputation, data (both
consumer and corporate), and intellectual
property. The infamous Stuxnet and the recent
Solar Winds attacks indicate the severity of the
impact of successful APT attacks on
organizations.
APTs are distinct from hit-and-run hacking
events because APTs have the following
distinguishing
characteristics:
customized,
persistent, organized, funded, sophisticated
(advanced tools and techniques), and timeliness
[2], [3]. Cybercriminals use multiple vectors and
entry points to breach enterprise networks and
evade detection for months. APTs present a
challenge for organizations because of their
complexity, duration, and undetectability.
“Attackers consistently prey on companies
that have what cybersecurity experts call a „false
sense of security‟ when it comes to relying too
much on technology to defend their networks” [4].
A false sense of security is simply the belief that
some situation is safer than it is [5]. Technologies
and processes often provide organizations with a
false sense of security. Enterprises rely on
technical solutions to protect themselves from
APTs. APTs are looming threats to enterprises,
both large and small enterprises. Despite the
awareness training, technological advancements,
and massive investment adopted in many
organizations, APT attacks still happen often [6].
It implies that sophisticated tools alone cannot
prevent organizations from APT attacks [7].
Several vaunted enterprises like Google, RSA,
DuPont, Walt Disney, Johnson & Johnson,
Morgan Stanley, Sony, General Electric, etc.,
were also victims of APT attacks [8]. An
organization may have security strategies to
prevent APTs. However, the benefits of the
implemented
security
strategies
to
the
organization‟s security posture might be
negligible. A false sense of security may exist
when an organization focuses on implementing
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security strategies but not on the effectiveness of
implemented security strategies.
On the other hand, organizational security
strategies are driven by compliance requirements.
There is a 125% increase in cybersecurity
incidents, impacting every industry and geography
year by year. APTs are considered a significant
factor in this increase. Most data breaches in
recent years have happened at compliant
businesses. Being compliant alone does not help
them evade APT attacks. The effectiveness of
security strategies directly influences on an
organization‟s sense of security. Hence, it is
critical to understand the factors that influence the
false sense of security to help organizations ensure
the effectiveness of implemented security
strategies. Research on the sense of security is
emerging. There is no empirical information
systems research that focuses on this area. This
research aims to understand if organizations are in
a false sense of security while preventing APT
attacks and if their culture influences their
preventive measures. Motivated by the discussed
theoretical and practical concerns, our research
targets to provide answers to two research
questions (RQs): RQ1) What are the most critical
factors (practices/controls) contributing to the
false sense of security? RQ2) Does organizational
culture influence defenses against APT attacks?
In this paper, we proposed a research model
that theorizes various factors that influences the
sense of security. Specifically, we explored the
relationship between the security measures and
employees' perceived sense of security in
organizations. This kind of relationship is never
examined before in the academic literature. Our
findings indicate the sense of security of
employees is low when the security controls are
ineffective. We identified what factors contribute
to enhancing the sense of security. We also
highlight what is missing in organizations while
they consider their defenses to prevent APT
attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section II discusses background on
APTs, and theoretical models utilized in
information security research. Section III presents
MANUSCRIPT CENTRAL
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our proposed theoretical model for this research
and the proposed hypotheses. Section IV
introduces the methodology adopted for this
research, followed by data analysis and results,
discussion, and research limitations in Sections V,
VI, and VII. Section VIII summarizes and
concludes the paper.
II. Background
APTs present a challenge due to their unique
and complex nature. Therefore, security
professionals face an uphill battle in defending
their networks as attacks become increasingly
sophisticated, particularly when it comes to APTs.
The lack of typical attack patterns and the
constantly new combination of different modes of
attacks and vectors make APT attacks
unpredictable and extremely difficult for
organizations to detect [9].
Our literature review indicates that: 1) Cyber
attackers hopelessly outclass off-the-shelf
solutions [10][11]. 2) Employees need security
education and a sober understanding of the
protection of systems to secure their critical assets
[12],[13]. 3) If critical/basic security controls are
not in place, it makes no sense to place advanced
controls like Security Orchestration, Automation,
and Response (SOAR) [14]. 4) Organizations
focus heavily on tools to prevent APT attacks;
non-technical attack vectors such as insider threat
and social engineering are not given much-needed
attention [6],[14],[16] . 5) Penetration testing
practice and compliance frameworks [16],[17]
adopted by organizations were not effective. The
evaluation of security strategies has been focused
on meeting compliance requirements and tools.
Vulnerabilities are often found in the daily
execution of organizational activities[19]. Security
risk needs to be considered from an organizational
perspective [19].
The field of information systems research has
contributed several theories pertaining to the
adoption and usage of technology. Theoretical
models such as the Technology Acceptance
Model (TAM) [20], the Theory of Planned
Behavior[21], the Health Belief model [22] exist
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and have been utilized in empirical research in
information security. However, the models in
[20],[21],[22] are based on behavioral constructs
and utilized to target individual behavior. There is
a lack of empirical research to evaluate
organizational security strategies based on
employees' subjective feelings on security.
Therefore, we look into this problem and propose
a theoretical model for evaluating organizational
security strategies in terms of the sense of
security.
III. Theoretical Model for Evaluating Sense of
Security
To formulate a research model that theorizes
various factors that influence the sense of security,
we selected independent, dependent, and
moderator variables from our literature review.
The key factors considered in the model include
security awareness and training, converged
testing, security controls, segmentation, redundant
IDS/IPS, insider threat prevention, and
cybersecurity insurance. The dependent variable,
Sense of security, in this research represents the
confidence level of employees about the strategic
organizational activities of security. The proposed
research model is illustrated in Figure 1.
The common methods used to mitigate APTs
include: 1) anomaly detection, 2) whitelists, 3)
blacklists, 4) intrusion detection system (IDS), 5)
awareness, 6) deception, 7) cryptography, 8)
traffic/ data analysis, 9) Security Information and
Event Management (SIEM), 10) pattern
recognition, 11) risk assessment, 12) multi-layer
security [23]. Our selection of independent
variables was primarily based on these methods.
The NIST Special Publication 800-171,
“Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information
in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations” also
influenced our selection of constructs. NIST
provides a comprehensive framework of controls
that organizations can follow to mitigate APTs.
However, all the independent variables are based
on the current threat landscape and the industry
best practices. If the threat landscape changes,
new independent variables could be needed for
new security controls to emerge.
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Information security culture is a subculture of
an organization‟s culture [24]. To enhance an
organization‟s cybersecurity culture, management
must implement the latest technology and invest
in the organizational culture [24]. Organizations
with a medium to high-security risk profile need
to embed the information security culture to
influence employee actions and behaviors about
information security practices[25]. In this
research, we considered organizational culture as
a moderator variable to find out how
organizational culture influences the relationship
between the independent and dependent variables.
The following subsections describe our research
constructs.
A. Security Awareness and Training (SA)
“Security awareness training is a usually
overlooked factor in most of implemented
information security programs” [12]. In the
context of Information Technology (IT), security
awareness and training programs are the typical
means used to communicate security requirements
and appropriate behavior [26]. Industry
compliance
standards/requirements
make
organizations run security awareness programs.
However, IT security awareness and training
programs can quickly become obsolete if not
updated with the technology advancements, IT
infrastructure, and organizational changes, and
shifts in organizational mission and priorities [13].
If organizations do not keep their security
awareness and training programs current,
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867

employees find no value in the security awareness
and training program and lose motivation.
B. Converged Testing (CT)
“Technical or logical controls involve the
hardware or software mechanisms used to manage
access and to provide protection for resources and
systems” [27]. Examples of technical or logical
controls include authentication methods (such as
usernames,
passwords,
smartcards,
and
biometrics), encryption, firewalls, and routers.
“Administrative controls are the policies and
procedures defined by an organization‟s security
policy and other regulations or requirements. They
are sometimes referred to as management
controls. These controls focus on personnel and
business
practices”
[27].
Examples
of
administrative
controls
include
policies,
procedures, hiring practices, background checks,
data classifications, and labeling. The focus is on
technical controls during security testing
(penetration testing, blue team testing, purple
team testing, or red team testing). Our literature
review did not find any testing methodology that
includes administrative controls in the security
testing
scope.
We
selected
converged
(administrative and technical controls) testing as
an independent variable.
C. Security Controls (SC)
The countermeasures organizations implement
to detect, prevent, reduce, counteract, or minimize
security risks are called security controls [28].
Contemporary cybersecurity risk management
MANUSCRIPT CENTRAL
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practices are primarily driven by compliance
requirements, forcing organizations to focus on
security controls and vulnerabilities. Security
controls should be built from threat intelligence to
complement controls focusing on compliance
requirements and known vulnerabilities [29]. It is
important to note that most data breaches in recent
years have happened at compliant businesses [30].
Setting up the security controls is one challenge
and effectively monitoring and auditing them is
another challenge.
D. Segmentation (SG)
Network segmentation is an architectural
approach that involves dividing a more extensive
network into smaller network segments, which
can be accomplished through firewalls, virtual
local area networks, and other separation
techniques. Modern cyberattacks take advantage
of weak security postures of data centers where an
attacker can move laterally within the data center
between different systems to steal information.
Data center design includes segmentation as a
fundamental information security principle,
however, at its most basic level. Microsegmentation is required to effectively protect
data centers from modern attacks. Microsegmentation down to the individual workload is
needed [31].
E. Redundant IDS/IPS (RD)
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are the first
line of defense for organizations against
cyberattacks. The war between attackers and
IDS/IPS developers never ends [32]. Even though
an IDS/IPS system is mostly reliable, there is a
possibility that an attacker can evade, which
creates a significant gap in cybersecurity. IDS/IPS
systems are improved continuously against
evasion techniques, but new evasion techniques
that can bypass IDS/IPS systems are still evolving
[33]. Implementing redundant IDS/IPS systems is
crucial in setting up defenses against APT attacks.
If one IDS/IPS cannot detect data exfiltration,
another IDS/IPS from a different vendor may
detect data exfiltration. Having multiple IDS/IPS
systems to monitor the same activity makes it
easier for analysts to confirm the validity of alerts
and identify false positives. It also provides
redundancy should one product fail for any reason
[34].
F. Insider Threat Prevention (IT)
“An insider threat is the risk posed by
employees or contractors regarding the theft of
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867

sensitive data, misuse of their access privileges, or
fraudulent activity that puts the organization‟s
reputation and brand at risk. The insider‟s
behavior can be malicious, complacent, or
ignorant, which in turn can amplify the impact to
the organization resulting in monetary and
reputational loss” [35]. An insider threat program
(ITP) is a set of policies, tools, and security/threat
assessment personnel focused on detecting insider
threat risks. The objective of an ITP is mitigating
or preventing insider threat incidents [36]. An
effective ITP incorporates several tools to help
prevent, detect, and respond to concerning
behaviors and activity. These tools or technical
controls fall into one of five categories: 1) user
activity monitoring, 2) data loss prevention, 3)
security information and event management, 4)
analytics, and 5) digital forensics and
investigations [37].
G. Cybersecurity Insurance (CI)
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) defines cybersecurity insurance as
“Cybersecurity insurance is designed to mitigate
losses from a variety of cyber incidents, including
data breaches, business interruption, and network
damage” [38]. Since APT attacks involve data
exfiltration and an organization can go bankrupt
after a successful cyberattack, we selected
cybersecurity insurance as an independent
variable to verify organizations' preparedness for
APT attacks.
H. Sense of Security (SS)
Sense of security can be better explained with
the Japanese word, Anshin. Anshin is formed by
“An” which means to ease, and “Shin,” which is
to mind. Someone feels Anshin when they are free
from worry and fear [39]. Confidence keeps
someone away from worry and fear, which means
having confidence equals Anshin. Sense of
security in our research represents the confidence
level of employees about the strategic
organizational activities of security.
I. Organization Culture (OC)
“Organizational culture is generally seen as a
set of key values, assumptions, understandings,
and norms shared by members of an organization
and taught to new members. Organizational
culture is an important moderator in business
research” [40]. According to Robert E. Quinn and
Kim S. Cameron at the University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor, there are four organizational culture
types: clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy
[41].
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Table 1 summarizes the operational definition
of our constructs.
TABLE 1:
Definition

Constructs

Factor
Security
awareness and
training

and

Hypotheses

Operational Definition
Effectiveness of security
awareness and training

Converged testing Implementation of converged
testing
Security controls

Effectiveness of security
controls

Segmentation

Effectiveness of segmentation

Redundant
IDS/IPS

Implementation of redundant
IDS/IPS

Insider threat
prevention

Effectiveness of insider threat
prevention

Cybersecurity
insurance

Purchase of cybersecurity
insurance

Sense of security User confidence with strategic
security activities
Organization
culture

Type of organization culture
(clan, adhocracy, market, or
hierarchy) [41]

This research aims to find answers for 14
hypotheses:
H1: Successful implementation of security
awareness and training positively impacts the
sense of security.
H2: Successful execution of converged testing
positively impacts the sense of security.
H3: Successful implementation of security
controls positively impacts the sense of security.
H4:
Successful
implementation
of
segmentation positively impacts the sense of
security.
H5: Successful implementation of redundant
IDS/IPS positively impacts the sense of security.
H6: Successful implementation of insider
threat prevention positively impacts the sense of
security.
H7: Successful execution of cybersecurity
insurance purchase positively impacts the sense of
security.
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H8: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between security awareness and
training and the sense of security.
H9: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between converged testing and the
sense of security.
H10: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between security controls and the
sense of security.
H11: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between segmentation and the sense
of security.
H12: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between redundant IDS/IPS and the
sense of security.
H13: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between insider threat prevention and
the sense of security.
H14: Organizational culture moderates the
relationship between cybersecurity insurance and
the sense of security.
VI. Research Methodology
A. Research Method
Our research approach is quantitative using
the survey method. The quantitative approach is
the best choice when the study's objective is to
identify factors that influence an outcome, the
utility of an intervention, or understanding the
best predictors of outcomes [42]. We designed a
survey that consists of 45 questions where
respondents are requested to submit responses in
the form of a Likert five-point scale with one
representing “strongly disagree” and five
representing “strongly agree.” This research
received IRB approval from the Dakota State
University.
There are seven constructs in the proposed
model, as shown in Figure 1. Five of the
constructs, including security controls, insider
threat prevention, cybersecurity insurance,
segmentation, and security awareness and
training, need to be measured with a group of
observable variables. Both converged testing and
redundant IDS/IPS have only one observable
variable. The survey questions are regarding
cybersecurity controls, and practices followed in
the industry. The data collected is participants‟
perceptions of cybersecurity controls and practices
followed in the industry. The survey subjects are
cybersecurity professionals with five or more
MANUSCRIPT CENTRAL
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years of work experience working for a private
(for-profit) organization.
B. Data Collection
The Survey Monkey platform was used to
administer the survey questionnaire and collect
responses from the survey participants. The
survey is anonymous. Using the Anonymous
Responses collector option provided by Survey
Monkey, we eliminated the possibility of tracking
and storing identifiable respondent information in
survey results. The survey was distributed to 600
qualified participants using email and LinkedIn in
spring 2021. There were 253 returned
questionnaires out of 600 distributed. 207 out of
253 returned questionnaires were useable, with an
82% completion rate.
C. Data Analysis Method
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) allows
for more precise testing of an instrument‟s factor
structure. CFA addresses construct validity by
assigning the items in an instrument to their
respective factors according to theoretical
expectations [43]. CFA helps to determine the
model fit. The result of CFA analysis provides
several model fit indices such as root mean square
error of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit
index (CFI), and Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) to
determine model fit for further analysis [44]. Once
unnecessary observable variables and factors are
discarded, the theoretical model will be ready to
uncover the cause-and-effect relationships using
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the partial least square structural equation
modeling (PLS-SEM). Warp PLS was used to
conduct PLS-SEM.
V. Data Analysis and Results
We performed CFA first before testing the
proposed hypotheses to ensure that the instrument
appropriately measures the latent constructs. We
used R and R Studio to conduct CFA. CFA
assumes that researchers enter the factor analysis
with a firm idea about the number of factors they
will encounter and which variables will most
likely load onto each factor. CFA provides factor
loadings and factor correlations. Factor loading
explains the strength of the relationship between
each item and the factors. Factor loading value of
≥ 0.7 indicates a strong relationship between the
item (observable variable) and the factor [45]. The
constructs with factor loading values of < 0.7 are
ignored to condense the number of observable
variables.
The result of the CFA analysis provides
several model fit indices like goodness-of-fit
index (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit index
(AGFI), normed fit index (NFI), Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI), comparative fit index (CFI), and root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) to
determine model fit for further analysis [44]. The
model fit indices from the CFA analysis were as
follows: GFI = 0.890, AGFI = 0.840, NFI = 0.817,
TLI = 0.000, CFI = 0.962, and RMSEA = 0.070.
All are in the acceptable range [46], [47].
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We used Warp PLS 7.0 to perform structural
equation modeling. Warp PLS provides an
integrated
environment
for
combining
measurement and structural models‟ calculations.
Using Warp PLS, we examined the validity and
reliability of our research instrument, model
accuracy, the effect of independent variables on
the dependent variable, and how the moderator
variable influences the relation between
independent and dependent variables. After CFA,
we fed our research model to Warp PLS to
conduct SEM analysis. Table 2 shows the
correlations among the constructs. As shown in
Table 2, Warp PLS warned about the highly
correlated constructs, CT and SG (0.848), IT and
SA (0.856), IT and SG (0.865), presented in the
model. This led to the next step in eliminating two
constructs, CT and IT, which have correlations (>
0.85) with the SG. The refined research model for
evaluating the sense of security is shown in Figure
2.

After revising the model, we performed SEM
analysis with Warp PLS again. The analysis did
not reveal any other correlations among the
constructs. It implies that the correlations among
the constructs are within the acceptable range.

The second step is assessing internal consistency
reliability by examining composite reliability
(CR). CR values between 0.70 and 0.90 range
from satisfactory to good. CR values of 0.95 and
above indicate the presence of redundant factors,
thereby reducing construct validity [48]. The CR
values of SA, SC, and SG are in the acceptable
range. The CR values of CI and RD are equal to
one because both the constructs have only one
factor. A higher CR value indicates higher
reliability if the CR value is not above 0.95.

Therefore, The CR values of all constructs are in
the good range. Cronbach‟s alpha value is another
measure of internal consistency reliability that
assumes similar thresholds [48]. Cronbach‟s alpha
value is described as excellent (0.93–0.94), strong
(0.91–0.93), reliable (0.84–0.90), robust (0.81),
fairly high (0.76–0.95), high (0.73–0.95), good
(0.71–0.91), relatively high (0.70–0.77), slightly
low (0.68), reasonable (0.67–0.87), adequate
(0.64–0.85),
moderate
(0.61–0.65),
not
satisfactory (0.4–0.55), and low (0.11) [49]. The
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A. Assessment of Measurement Model
The indicators used in the model are
reflective. We further assessed the observing
internal consistency, each indicator‟s reliability,
convergent reliability, and discriminant validity
for the refined model.
The first step in reflective measurement model
assessment is examining the indicator loadings.
Factor loading values above 0.708 are
recommended, as they indicate that the construct
explains more than 50 percent of the indicator‟s
variance, thus providing acceptable item
reliability [48]. Factor loadings of all constructs
are above the recommended value of 0.708, as
shown in Table 3.
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Cronbach‟s alpha values of all the constructs are
shown in Table 3. The Cronbach‟s alpha values of
the constructs under study are in the excellent to
the reliable range.
“While Cronbach‟s alpha may be too
conservative, the composite reliability may be too
liberal, and the construct‟s true reliability is

typically viewed as within these two extreme
values” [48]. As an alternative, Dijkstra and
Henseler proposed consistent PLS (PLSc) as an
approximately exact measure of construct
reliability, whose value usually lies between
Cronbach‟s
alpha
and
the
composite
reliability[50].

The Dijkstra‟s PLSc values of all constructs
lie between Cronbach‟s alpha value and CR value,
as shown in Table 3. Internal consistency
reliability of constructs was verified with factor
loadings, composite reliability, Cronbach‟s alpha,
and Dijkstra‟s PLSc.

The fourth step is to assess discriminant
validity, which tests whether the concepts or the
measurements that are not supposed to be related
are unrelated. Discriminant validity represents the
extent to which a construct is empirically distinct
from other constructs in the structural model [48].
Discriminant validity is assessed with the
heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio of the
correlations. The HTMT is defined as the mean
value of the item correlations across constructs
relative to the (geometric) mean of the average
correlations for the items measuring the same
construct [48]. The threshold value for HTMT is
0.90, and HTMT value above 0.90 suggests lack
of discriminant validity[53]. The HTMT ratio
values for the constructs in our model are below
the threshold value of 0.90, as shown in Table 4,
confirming that discriminant validity is present.

The third step of the reflective measurement
model assessment is to examine the convergent
validity of each construct measure. “Convergent
validity is the extent to which the construct
converges to explain the variance of its items”
[48]. The average variance extracted (AVE) for all
items on each construct is the metric used for
evaluating a construct‟s convergent validity. An
acceptable AVE is 0.50 or higher to establish
convergent validity [48], [51], [52].

SA
SA
SG
SC
CI
RD

0.893
0.882

TABLE 4: HTMT RATIOS
SG
SC

CI

RD

0.861

.
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MANUSCRIPT CENTRAL

21859

B. Assessment of Structural Model
The structural model is used to estimate the
relationships between the latent dependent and
independent variables. Before assessing the
structural relationships, collinearity must be
examined to make sure that multicollinearity is

VIF

SA
3.902

not present. The variance inflation factor
(VIF) is the most common way to detect
multicollinearity. VIF values above 5 are
indicative of probable collinearity issues among
the predictor constructs [48], [54]. The VIF values
of predictor variables in our model are below, as
shown in Table 5. Therefore, there is no
collinearity issue.

TABLE 5: VIF VALUES
SG
SC
CI
4.447
2.014
2.855

Since there is no collinearity issue, the next
step is examining the standard assessment criteria,
including the coefficient of determination (R 2), the
blindfolding-based cross-validated redundancy
measure Q2, and the statistical significance and
relevance of the path coefficients [48].
The coefficient of determination (R2) is
considered in the case of endogenous constructs
[48], but there are no endogenous constructs in
our model. Since the R2 value is a measure of a
model predictive power and WarpPLS computes

RD
3.156

R2 value, we considered examining R2 value.
R value of 0.75, 0.50 and 0.25 can be considered
substantial, moderate, and weak [54], [55]. The R2
value of our research model is 0.52, as shown in
Figure 3. Our model‟s predictive power is
moderate. “As a rule of thumb, Q2 values higher
than 0, 0.25 and 0.50 depict small, medium and
large predictive relevance of the PLS-path model”
[48]. The Q2 value of our research model is 0.622.
Thus, our research model‟s predictive relevance is
high.
2

Figure 3: Coefficient of Determination
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867
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C. Hypotheses Testing
H1 states that successful implementation of
security awareness and training positively impacts
the sense of security. Table 6 shows that the pvalue of security awareness and training on
influencing the sense of security is 0.010 with the
value of path coefficient of 0.161. This p-value is
less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it
can be concluded that the successful
implementation of security awareness and training
positively impacts the sense of security.
H2 states that successful execution of
converged testing positively impacts the sense of
security. This hypothesis was dropped from the
study as converged testing is highly correlated
with the other predictor variable segmentation.
H3 states that successful implementation of
security controls positively impacts the sense of
security. Table 6 shows that the p-value of
security controls on influencing the sense of
security is less than 0.001 with the value of path
coefficient of 0.280. This p-value is less than 0.05
(significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be
concluded that the successful implementation of
security controls positively impacts the sense of
security.
H4 states that successful implementation of
segmentation positively impacts the sense of
security. Table 6 shows that the p-value of
segmentation influencing the sense of security is
less than 0.180 with the value of path coefficient
of 0.064. This p-value is greater than 0.05
(significance > 0.05). Therefore, it can be
concluded that the successful implementation of
segmentation does not positively impact the sense
of security.
H5 states that successful implementation of
redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the sense of
security. Table 6 shows that the p-value of
redundant IDS/IPS on influencing the sense of
security is 0.011 with the value of path coefficient
of 0.157. This p-value is less than 0.05
(significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be
concluded that the successful implementation of
redundant IDS/IPS positively impacts the sense of
security.
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H6 states that successful implementation of
insider threat prevention positively impacts the
sense of security. This hypothesis was dropped
from the study as insider threat prevention is
highly correlated with two predictor variables,
segmentation and security awareness and training.
H7 states that successful execution of
cybersecurity insurance purchase positively
impacts the sense of security. Table 6 shows that
the p-value of cybersecurity insurance influencing
the sense of security is less than 0.001 with the
value of path coefficient of 0.236. This p-value is
less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it
can be concluded that the successful execution of
cybersecurity insurance purchase positively
impacts the sense of security.
H8 states that organizational culture moderates
the relationship between security awareness and
training and the sense of security. Table 6 shows
that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between security
awareness and training and the sense of security is
0.004 with the value of path coefficient of 0.185.
This p-value is less than 0.05 (significance <
0.05). Therefore, it can be concluded that
organizational culture moderates the relationship
between security awareness and training and the
sense of security.
H9 states that organizational culture moderates
the relationship between converged testing and the
sense of security. This hypothesis was dropped
from the study as the predictor variable converged
testing was dropped from the study.
H10 states that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between security
controls and the sense of security. Table 6 shows
that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between security
controls and sense of security is 0.010 with the
value of path coefficient of 0.159. This p-value is
less than 0.05 (significance < 0.05). Therefore, it
can be concluded that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between security
controls and the sense of security.
H11 states that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between segmentation
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and the sense of security. Table 6 shows that the
p-value of organizational culture on influencing
the relationship between segmentation and sense
of security is 0.017 with the value of path
coefficient of 0.147. This p-value is less than 0.05
(significance < 0.05). Therefore, it can be
concluded that organizational culture moderates
the relationship between segmentation and the
sense of security.
H12 states that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between redundant
IDS/IPS and the sense of security. Table 6 shows
that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between redundant
IDS/IPS and the sense of security is 0.394 with
the value of path coefficient of 0.019. This pvalue is greater than 0.05 (significance > 0.05).
Therefore, it can be concluded that organizational
culture does not moderate the relationship
between redundant IDS/IPS and the sense of
security.

H13 states that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between insider threat
prevention and the sense of security. This
hypothesis was dropped from the study as the
predictor variable insider threat prevention was
dropped from the study.
H14 states that organizational culture
moderates the relationship between cybersecurity
insurance and the sense of security. Table 6 shows
that the p-value of organizational culture on
influencing the relationship between cybersecurity
insurance and the sense of security is 0.358 with
the value of path coefficient of 0.025. This pvalue is greater than 0.05 (significance > 0.05).
Therefore, it can be concluded that organizational
culture does not moderate the relationship
between cybersecurity insurance and the sense of
security.

TABLE 6: PATH COEFFICIENTS
Relation
Path Coefficient p-Value Description
H1 SA -> SS 0.161
0.010 Supported
H3 SC -> SS -0.280
<0.001 Supported
H4 SG -> SS -0.064
0.180 Not Supported
H5 RD -> SS 0.157
0.011 Supported
H7 CI -> SS 0.236
<0.001 Supported
H8 OC -> SA 0.185
0.004 Supported
H10 OC -> SC -0.159
0.010 Supported
H11 OC -> SG -0.147
0.017 Supported
H12 OC -> RD -0.019
0.394 Not Supported
H14 OC -> CI -0.025
0.358 Not Supported
VI. Discussion
There is news on data breaches due to APTs
almost every day. The amount of money spent on
improving the security posture, whether it is on
cybersecurity products, services, or training,
increases year by year. Despite all the awareness
training, technological advancements, and
massive investment, the fight against APTs could
be challenging for any organization if their
cybersecurity products, services, or training are
not adequately or effectively implemented. While
managing cybersecurity posture, corporations
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867

focus on security products and services but not
on employees‟ perception of cybersecurity
posture. This research is aimed at how employees
feel about the security posture of corporations and
the
effectiveness
of
security
measures
implemented by the corporations. We referred to
employees‟ perception of cybersecurity posture as
the sense of security and investigated what factors
influence the sense of security. Our survey found
that employees are not confident about their
organizations'
cybersecurity posture.
The
responses we received showed that the average of
employees‟ confidence about cybersecurity
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posture was 1.8 (Strongly Disagree 1, Disagree 2,
Neither Agree nor Disagree 3, Agree 4, Strongly
Agree 5).
Our study confirms that security awareness
and training, security controls, implementation of
redundant IDS/IPS, and purchase of cybersecurity
insurance are important factors that influence
employees‟ sense of security. This study also
confirms that organizational culture influences the
relationship of security awareness and training,
and security controls with the sense of security.
This
research
found
that
effective
segmentation did not influence the employees‟
sense of security. The reason that our hypothesis
regarding the segmentation was not supported
might
be
due
to
a
lack
of
understanding/knowledge/awareness
of
segmentation. Our study confirms that the
organizational culture influences the relationship
of segmentation with the sense of security.
Cybersecurity is a vast domain. Since it is
impossible to include many independent variables
in the research, we limited our independent
variables to seven. During the SEM analysis, we
found that there were strong correlations (> 0.85)
among converged testing, insider threat
prevention, and segmentation. We had to drop two
independent variables, converged testing and
insider threat prevention, from the initial model.
We
suggest
the
following
recommendations for the constructs contributing
to false sense of security to improve the
effectiveness of the controls in combating APTs:
A. Security Awareness and Training:
Security awareness and training campaigns
should measure the impact of the awareness
sessions rather than only tracking who attended
those sessions, the number of users who passed
the exams, etc. We recommend a cyber security
awareness measurement model: Analyze, Predict,
Awareness, and Test (APAT) [56]. APAT model
involves a four-step cycle: analyzing the current
threats, predicting the impact of threats, providing
security awareness and training, and measuring
the effectiveness of security awareness and
training provided. The APAT model solves the
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867

challenge of delivering an effective security
awareness and training program as the program
outcome measurement is a part of the model. The
APAT model also addresses the challenge of
providing relevant and updated training.
B. Redundant IDS/IPS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)/Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS) are the first lines of
defense against APT attacks. “APTs are
specifically designed to defeat controls such as
firewalls, anti-virus, and intrusion-detection
systems, and especially those that rely on
signatures and can therefore guard only against
known threats” [57]. We recommend redundancy
in setting up IDS/IPS. Even if each IDS uses a
different detection technique, they analyze each
other's alerts and reduce false positives. A reliable
intrusion detection solution cannot be achieved
without using multiple types of IDS/IPS
technologies [34].
C. Security Controls
Security controls are the countermeasures that
organizations implement to detect, prevent,
reduce, counteract, or minimize security risks are
called security controls [28]. To address the everchanging threat landscape, security controls
should be built from threat intelligence to
complement controls focusing on compliance
requirements and known vulnerabilities [29]. We
recommend considering a CTI platform because
of its agility without much human intervention.
When selecting a control assessor or team of
assessors, we recommend selecting the assessor or
assessors with deep technical knowledge
regarding the systems and their security.
D. Cybersecurity Insurance
Cybersecurity insurance pays for a company
to hire a cybersecurity corporation that conducts a
forensic investigation to reveal precisely what
happened in an attack [58]. It pays for the legal
services required after the attack. APT attacks
involve data exfiltration. Hence, it is possible that
an organization can go bankrupt after a successful
cyberattack. We recommend adding cybersecurity
insurance to the organization's security program.
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Table 7 below shows our recommendation for
enhancing controls based on NIST 800-53
Security and Privacy Controls [59]. We selected
the NIST 800-53 set of controls to enhance

security because it is more complex, more
restrictive, and contains more security controls
than necessary for any business sector [60].

Table 7: Security and Privacy Controls to Remediate False Sense of Security
Independent
Variable
Security Controls

Redundant
IDS/IPS
Security
Awareness and
Training
Cybersecurity
Insurance

NIST Control

Action Item

CA-2 Control Assessments

Enhance the security control by ensuring
that the assessor or assessment team
selected for assessment has deep
technical knowledge of the systems and
their security.
Enhance the appropriate controls based
on threat intelligence feeds.
Enhance the control based on the threat
intelligence feeds.
Enhance the control with redundant
IDS/IPS systems to monitor the network
and systems.
Enhance the control by applying the
APAT (Analyze, Predict, Awareness,
and Test) model.
Enhance the control by adding a plan to
procure cybersecurity insurance.

ACCESS Control Group: AC1 to AC-25
PL-2 SYSTEM SECURITY
AND PRIVACY PLANS
SI-4
SYSTEM
MONITORING
AT-2
LITERACY
TRAINING
AND
AWARENESS
PM-1
INFORMATION
SECURITY
PROGRAM
PLAN
PM-4 PLAN OF ACTION
AND
MILESTONES
PROCESS
PM-9 RISK MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY

VII. Limitations
The limitations of this research include: 1) We
reached out to 600 qualified participants and
received 253 returned questionnaires. Our survey
response rate was close to 42%. We had sufficient
data to conduct analysis. However, it will be great
to receive more survey responses. 2) Because the
survey is about employee perception of corporate
security posture and the survey population is
security professionals, it is possible that more than
half of the survey population did not feel
comfortable responding to the survey even though
it was anonymous. 3) Our research is the first of
its kind, studying the employees‟ perception of
IJCRR 13 (07), 21851−21867

Enhance the control by purchasing
cybersecurity insurance.
Enhance the control by adding
cybersecurity insurance as a risk transfer
method.

security posture vs. corporate security measures.
We could not find a model to adopt from the
existing information systems literature. 4)
Cybersecurity is a vast domain. It is hard to select
and limit the number of independent variables in
the research.
VIII. Conclusion and Future Work
Despite
all
the
awareness
training,
technological advancements, and massive
investment, this research confirms that employees
are not confident about the cybersecurity posture
of organizations. Our research identified what
influences
the
employee
perception of

MANUSCRIPT CENTRAL

21864

cybersecurity posture or sense of security.
Organizations need to consider not only
implementing the security measures but also their
effectiveness. Organizations rely on analytical
reports generated by tools to validate the
effectiveness of security measures implemented.
However, they rarely consider the employee
perception or confidence about the implemented
cybersecurity measures. Employee feedback on
security measures is a great additional method to
validate the effectiveness of the implemented
security measures. Employee feedback helps to
check the real effectiveness of security measures
and may help to invest security budget at the right
place. The research confirms that organizations
need a paradigm shift on protecting themselves
against APTs. We dropped two independent
variables, converged testing and insider threat
prevention, due to correlations with segmentation.
In further research, the two constructs we dropped
may need to be reevaluated to find out what
caused correlations due to their presence. Further,
additional independent variables could be
considered in the research model.
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